Tags › sip security
SIPVicious OSS 0.3.2 released with more IPv6 goodness!
Published on Mar 3, 2021 in sipvicious oss, security tools, sip security, sipvicious releases
The free and opensource version of SIPVicious has been updated so that support for IPv6 is also available in svmap. If you can’t wait to try it out, you can get it at the official repository or by using pip3 install sipvicious --upgrade. So now, with svmap’s IPv6 support, you can do stuff like: sipvicious_svmap -6 -v 2a01:7e01::f03c:92ff:fecf:60a8 INFO:DrinkOrSip:trying to get self ip .. might take a while INFO:root:start your engines INFO:DrinkOrSip:-:61500 -> 2a01:7e01::f03c:92ff:fecf:60a8:5060 -> kamailio (5.…
SIPVicious PRO 6.0.0-beta.2 takes STDIN and fixes various bugs
Published on Feb 9, 2021 in sip security, sipvicious pro, sip security testing, sipvicious releases
What we’re excited about in this minor update is the addition of a new feature to the SIP cracker in SIPVicious PRO. Basically, it now takes input from external tools through standard input. Why? Because it allows infinite ways of generating potential usernames, passwords and/or SIP extensions when making use of external tools such as the maskprocessor included in the well known password cracker, hashcat. Here’s an animation showing usage of the maskprocessor to generate passwords for the SIP online cracking tool:…
Bug discovery diaries: uncovering sngrep overflow issues with blackbox fuzzing
Published on Jan 5, 2021 in fuzzing, sip security, sipvicious pro, sip security testing, opensips
Executive summary (TL;DR) During OpenSIPIt, we crashed sngrep by mistake while briefly fuzzing OpenSIPS. Later on we setup a docker environment to reproduce the issue, identified the actual bugs and reported them upstream. If you want to learn the simple steps to do this, you actually have to read the rest of the post :-) sngrep crash during the live OpenSIPit event Last year we participated in OpenSIPIt’s interoperability testing event which was held between the 14th and 15th of September 2020.…
SIPVicious PRO beta release contains SIP fuzzer and better automation
Published on Dec 3, 2020 in fuzzing, sip security, sipvicious pro, sip security testing, sipvicious releases
We just made SIPVicious PRO v6.0.0-beta.1 available to our beta testers. This latest release brings a new SIP fuzzer and enhancements for automation to your favourite RTC offensive security toolset. We have the following highlights with this release: New fuzzing tools - sip fuzz method. This used to be in a separate internal tool called gasoline (see our toolset page); this now been polished and has joined the SVPRO toolset; this has been used to identify vulnerabilities in Kamailio (advisory), sngrep (advisory 1 and 2) and other SIP servers.…
How doing QA testing for SIPVicious PRO led to an Asterisk DoS
Published on Nov 10, 2020 in fuzzing, sip security, sipvicious pro, sip security testing
Executive summary (TL;DR) While heavily testing SIPVicious PRO for bugs, we encountered an unexpected crash in Asterisk. We reported this to the Asterisk team, who recently issued a fix. If you’re a vendor, you too can beta test SIPVicious PRO! How the Asterisk crash was found We test our software as much as we can because, like any other software, ours contains bugs too! When it comes to SIPVicious PRO, one of our quality assurance tests is to run it against instances of Asterisk and Kamailio and check for expected results.…
ClueCon Weekly with Sandro Gauci, demonstration of SIP Digest Leak
Published on Oct 16, 2020 in conferences, sip security, sip security testing
ClueCon weekly is a regular video by the people behind Freeswitch and Signalwire, hosted by the very friendly David Duffet. I had the pleasure of recording an interview and a presentation with David a few weeks back. If you would like a summary of what the video chat was about, scroll down to the points below. Otherwise, hope you enjoy the chat as much as I did! Summary Here’s an outline of what went on:…
The great Kamailio security debate and some misconceptions debunked
Published on Sep 22, 2020 in kamailio, sip security
Introduction The Kamailio community has always been very welcoming to us since our first connection in 2015 where I gave a dangerous demo showing the open-source version of SIPVicious scanning the Internet and discovering all sorts of SIP devices. Since then, we’ve been contributing through presentations at Kamailio World each year, highlighting various security concerns for the RTC community and the occasional security report and advisory urging people to upgrade their Kamailio.…
Smuggling SIP headers past Session Border Controllers FTW!
Published on Sep 1, 2020 in kamailio, sip security, gasoline, sip security testing
Executive summary (TL;DR) SIP Header smuggling is a thing; in some cases it may be super-bad. It affected Kamailio and we have published a Github project to easily demonstrate and test this for yourself. Kamailio has since fixed the issue in release 5.4.0 but similar issues are likely to affect other SBCs. Usage of special SIP headers When it comes to trusted SIP networks, one of the primary ways that information is passed across different hops is through SIP headers.…
Kamailio World Online SIP and VoIP Security Panel
Published on Aug 27, 2020 in sip security, conferences, webrtc security, voip security, kamailio
On 2nd September, 14:00-14:30 Berlin time, the author of this post is joining Olle E. Johansson to chat at Kamailio World online about (guess what?) SIP and VoIP security, and recommendations on how working from home impacts security. I very much look forward to our discussions that will be streamed live on the Kamailio World youtube channel! My arguments will likely be turned into an opinion piece later on, but they’ll likely steer towards the following thoughts:…
Attacking a real VoIP System with SIPVicious OSS
Published on Jun 8, 2020 in sipvicious oss, security tools, sip security
Recently, we put out a target server on the Internet at demo.sipvicious.pro which hosts a Kamailio Server handling SIP over UDP, TCP, TLS as well as WebSockets. Behind that, the observant reader will soon discover that an Asterisk server handles the voicemail and echo services. This is actually a fully functioning (real) VoIP system that’s ready to be attacked. Therefore, in combination, these software packages allow us to reproduce a number of common security vulnerabilities affecting VoIP and WebRTC systems.…